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Ariel Merari purports to demonstrate a tendency on the part of suicide bombers to be
motivated by depression and suicidal tendencies. However, he misconstrues the present
authors’ critique of his work and misinterprets their research. By clarifying both issues,
this article seeks to substantiate three claims: (1) Merari’s sampling procedure precludes
generalization; (2) interviewer and contextual effects probably bias his findings; (3)
evidence challenges his inferences.
Focus on Method
We first want to apologize to Professor Merari for giving him the impression that our critique
of his book consisted of jabs at his “scientific integrity.”1 We sought to focus exclusively
on methodological issues that compromise the validity of his findings. We deliberately did
not personalize our disagreement by using the emotive language that he employs in his
response. In this rejoinder, we continue focusing on methodological concerns rather than
expressing outrage or engaging in personal assault.
Merari devotes ten pages to his critique, the first three of which assert that we con-
structed a “straw man” insofar as we claimed he identified depression and suicidality as
the “main factors” motivating suicide bombers.2 Actually, we were at pains to note that
“Merari’s argument is neither monocausal nor exclusively psychological. He acknowledges
that a host of social and political factors influence the propensity of individuals to engage
in suicide attacks.”3 Thus, we do not hold the “false idea” that Merari “explained terrorist
suicide by the assailants’ depression” and we did not “chose to ignore” his multivariate
analysis.4 We merely selected one set of factors for special scrutiny because, to us, it lacks
credibility and supporting evidence.
Our criticisms of Merari’s book were threefold. First, we argued that the nature of his
sample precludes generalization. Second, we asserted that interviewer and contextual effects
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probably biased his findings. Third, we presented evidence challenging his inferences.
Apparently, Merari failed to understand all three points, inadvertently changing our intended
meaning to fit his misunderstandings.
Sampling
On one fact we agree: Merari’s sample is tiny and unrepresentative. Can one therefore draw
meaningful inferences from it? Merari’s response is clear: yes and no. On the one hand,
and to his credit, he cautions the reader not to be overly bold in generalizing his findings.
On the other hand, because his book’s original contribution is its psychological profiling
of suicide bombers (the rest is based on secondary sources), Merari trumpets as its chief
selling point the significance of his “direct psychological examination” that “enables a first-
hand assessment of the personality characteristics and motivation of suicide bombers.”5 He
repeatedly heralds the “unprecedented” originality of the psychological component of his
research.6 He devotes considerably more space to discussing the psychological factors that
supposedly explain suicide bombing than to social, political, and economic factors. The very
title of his book (Driven to Death; emphasis added) stresses the significance of his finding
a disproportionate prevalence of psychopathology among respondents. Thus, although
Merari nowhere claims that depression and suicidality are the main factors underlying
suicide bombing, he does assert that they are significant factors, and it is the latter inference
that concerns us because the nature of his sample does not allow it. An alternative approach
to dealing with a tiny and unrepresentative sample involves taking a page from any first-
year undergraduate statistics textbook and stating that no confirmatory inferences at all can
be drawn from a sample such as Merari’s.7 It is, we think, the appropriately modest and
responsible approach.
Merari also mentions our supposed “complaint that a random sample was not used” in
his research.8 We made no such complaint. We did write, “even if one accepts that all 15
of Merari’s respondents were suicide bombers [which they were not—R.B. and B.A.], it is
unclear that they are representative of completed suicide bombers [emphasis added—R.B.
and B.A.].”9 Our point was about the inadmissibility of generalizations based on his sample.
It was not a recommendation for improving his research design. We understand even without
Merari’s clarification that one cannot interview dead people.
Bias
We identified five potential sources of bias in Merari’s inferences, all of which he dismisses.
1. Merari may have been inclined to overdiagnose depression and suicidality. In his
reply to our critique, Merari denies the existence of a longstanding inclination on
his part to suspect that psychopathology drives suicide bombers. Yet he writes,
“In an early article (Merari, 1990, p. 206), I suggested that suicide terrorism is
undertaken by people who ‘wish to die for personal reasons.’ . . . My suggestion
was clearly speculative.”10 We checked, and found that he reports his 1990 article
accurately. We conclude that Merari developed a pet theory about the relationship
between depression/suicidality and suicide bombing more than two decades ago,
long before he had any supporting evidence.
We discovered trace evidence of Merari’s apparent inclination to overdiagnosis
depression and suicidality in his idiosyncratic interpretation of card 3BM of the
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)11 (which he fails to defend) and in his review of
Nasra Hassan’s research. She found three main personality types among the suicide
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bombers whose families she interviewed. However, when Merari offered extended
examples in his book of personality types drawn from her sample, they were all
introverted and possibly depressed types, suggesting that Merari emphasized data
confirming his pet theory over those that did not. (In his reply to our critique of his
book, Merari asserts that Hassan “did not try to assess the suicides’ personalities”
in her interviews. However, that is precisely what she did. She characterized some
suicides as sociable extroverts, some as leaders, and others as introverts. Merari, too,
assessed the suicides’ personalities using Hassan’s data although he now denies it.
Specifically, he devoted all of chapter 4 of his book to “extract[ing] from [Hassan’s]
interviews information on factors that might influence readiness to carry out a
suicide attack . . . [including] psychopathology.”12)
2. The fact that Merari’s respondents were political prisoners serving life sentences in
Israeli jails may have led them to exhibit more depression and suicidality than one
would find outside the prison system. As we noted, psychiatrists investigating politi-
cal prisoners in Germany detected just such a tendency. Merari claims that by “con-
trolling for the effect of incarceration” he eliminated this possibility.13 However, his
control was faulty. Members of his experimental group received life sentences for at-
tempted suicide bombing. Members of his control group were incarcerated for “a va-
riety of security-related offences,”14 including relatively minor offenses that would
have involved lighter sentences. “Incarceration” is therefore not an adequate control
variable. Severity of sentence is; we suppose that, on average, prisoners’ psycholog-
ical reaction to, say, a five-year sentence differs from their reaction to a life sentence.
Merari in fact acknowledges that, as far as his experimental group is concerned,
“incarceration may affect their responses in psychological interviews and tests. Fur-
thermore, their responses may be skewed by their desire to impress the interviewers
favorably.”15 Yet he proceeds to take his interviews and tests at face value.
3. At least six of Merari’s fifteen would-be suicide bombers lacked the resolve to com-
plete their suicide mission. Merari acknowledges this fact but fails to understand
its implication: Depression in as many as 40 percent of his respondents may have
been due to their disappointing their organizational sponsor, the Palestinian public,
and themselves, not to a preexisting psychological condition, as Merari asserts. It
is an elementary statistical principle that correlation is not causality.16 When other
plausible explanatory factors are correlated with the original variables and inter-
vene between them, the original correlation (in this case, between a psychological
condition and engaging in a suicide attack) may be spurious.
4. Merari’s interviews and tests were conducted by authority figures who respondents
likely viewed as part of the coercive apparatus of an Israeli penal institution, perhaps
leading them to respond less than candidly. The tendency of research subjects to
react to the presence and characteristics of researchers and research instruments
independently of an experimental stimulus or a questionnaire item in a survey is
not exactly news. Acknowledged and explicitly dealt with in various ways in all of
the social sciences since at least 1958,17 the problem of “reactivity” is standard fare
in sociology, industrial psychology, and organizational behavior textbooks.18
We found evidence of reactivity in the research that Merari reported. In particular,
he had to scrap the results of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) he admin-
istered because 36 percent of his respondents gave clearly invalid answers. Despite
such a clear warning that reactivity contaminated his findings, he proceeded to base
his psychological assessment on projective tests (Rorschach and TAT) that many
psychologists regard as unreliable and invalid instruments that were never intended
for formal diagnosis. By highlighting the “importance of the projective techniques
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used by the study’s authors,”19 Merari admits that he relied on highly problematic
research instruments that maximize researchers’ interpretive leeway. Merari does
not defend himself against such damaging criticism because, we suspect, he cannot.
5. Insofar as at least some of the interviewers were affiliated with the Israeli defense
establishment, they may have had an unconscious political interest in coming up
with findings that depoliticize and delegitimize the Palestinian national movement.
Merari becomes petulant at our suggesting this possibility:
Throughout the present author’s academic career he has never let po-
litical positions influence his scientific integrity. This insinuation is
particularly preposterous because Araj himself, a Palestinian, reports in
this same article on a study in which he assessed the existence of depres-
sion among Palestinian suicide bombers, without using any objective
psychological tests. It seems that in his view his scientific objectivity
is beyond doubt, but Israeli psychologists must always be treated with
suspicion. And what about Brym? Does he not have political opinions
that might affect his research?20
We wish to allay Merari’s suspicion that we are victimizing him and his research
team because of their citizenship. All social scientists are victims of their political
and other values, a problem Max Weber first wrote about in 1904:
There is no absolutely “objective” scientific analysis of . . . “social phe-
nomena” independent of special and “one-sided” viewpoints according
to which—expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are
selected, analyzed and organized for expository purposes.21
The question is, what do we do about this uncomfortable reality?
One possibility, apparently favored by Merari, is to deny it and hide behind shib-
boleths insisting on the “scientific” and “objective” character of largely unreflective
research conducted by people with appropriate certification that supposedly gives
them privileged access to the truth. Another possibility, which we favor, is to ac-
knowledge Weber’s dilemma, try our best to eliminate bias, publicize our data and
analyses, leave ourselves open to the sometimes biting scrutiny of the community
of social scientists, and live with the intersubjective (never “objective”) consensus
that emerges from the ensuing debate.22 We strongly believe that only the latter
approach—not appeals to authority, which are the very antithesis of the scientific
mindset23—entitles researchers to call their work scientific.
Our Research
Merari criticizes the study that we conducted, which was based on a 25 percent random
sample of immediate family members and close friends of Second Intifada suicide bombers.
As we emphasized and as Merari repeats, we are not accredited clinical psychologists
and did not use a battery of standard psychological tests to assess our respondents for-
mally. However, we never claimed to be making a formal psychological assessment of our
respondents. We merely asked respondents
a series of questions about the suicide bomber’s personality, whether s/he
suffered any social, emotional or financial crisis, and so on . . . to analyze the
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degree to which psychological stressors affected each bomber’s state of mind
in the year preceding his or her attack.24
Specifically, we wanted to know if the bombers
manifested, in the year before their attack, (1) . . . chronic feelings of sadness,
repeated tearfulness, and diminished pleasure in normal activities or personal
crisis that could have led to depression (including a deep-seated desire for
revenge, inability to achieve highly valued goals, and wrenching goal conflict);
or (2) no outward sign . . . or personal crisis that could have led to depression.25
Contrary to what Merari writes,26 our interviews did not total 90 minutes per suicide
bomber family. We interviewed two to four family members and close friends of each
suicide bomber in our sample. Thus, total interview time per suicide bomber was about 180
to 360 minutes.27 Despite these in-depth, semi-structured, independent interviews, we were
careful not to diagnose depression at all—just behavior that could have led to depression.
Since we are accredited sociologists, we hope Merari can allow that we are entitled to
conduct a survey of this sort, which resembles the survey from which Hassan and Merari
felt perfectly comfortable drawing inferences similar to ours.
Merari also scores us for not having a control group that would allow us to compare
(1) the percentage of respondents who manifested signs indicating they might be depressed
with (2) the percentage of people in the corresponding population who might be depressed.
Again true. However, what we did have were the results of a sample survey conducted by
Israeli medical researchers giving us a measure of the prevalence of depression in Israel’s
Palestinian population: 24.9 percent, compared to 24 percent of the suicide bombers in our
sample who could have been depressed. Merari found that 53 percent of would-be suicide
bombers in his sample were depressed, but we have no confidence in his finding because
of the sampling and bias issues raised earlier.
Finally, Merari complains that we took three quotations out of context when we wrote
the following about the Hassan/Merari study:
Nasra Hassan’s interviews with family members of nearly all Palestinian suicide
bombers before the Second Intifada discovered that “the portrait of the suicide
bomber . . . may not be all that exceptional in the context of Palestinian society
at the time,” “all suicides came from typical Palestinian families,” and “no
single personality type emerged” from her analysis.28
Merari writes that our quotations “implied that the families were ordinary and normal in all
respects.”29 However, “in all respects” is entirely his invention. In fact, we ourselves showed
that the suicide bombers in our study “differed from the Palestinian population in terms of
their gender, age structure, and marital and employment status” but not in terms of economic
status, occupational distribution for non-students, and geographical distribution.30 Hassan
and Merari showed that the suicide bombers in their study were similar to the Palestinian
population in terms of the proportion who had thrown stones at Israeli forces and settlers
in the occupied territories, delivered supplies to organizational activists, were shot at by
Israelis, suffered physical assault by Israelis, and came from large families. Merari also
writes that “in quoting the five words ‘no single personality type emerged’ Brym and Araj
try to create the impression that the [Hassan/Merari] families’ study found that the suicides
had no distinctive personality characteristics.”31 We marvel at Merari’s claim to know what
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ob
ert
 J.
 B
ry
m]
 at
 08
:25
 17
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
738 R. J. Brym and B. Araj
impression we were trying to create; actually, all we meant by “no single personality type
emerged” is, well, that no single personality type emerged. Specifically, as Merari wrote,
“fifteen . . . were described by their families as introverted, loners, quiet, non-gregarious,
and inhibited, nine . . . were depicted as leader types, and three . . . as sociable extroverts.”32
By our count, this amounts to three personality types.
We acknowledge two errors in our critique. In citing the members of Merari’s research
team, we misspelled Giora Zakin’s first name “Gora” and Jonathan Fighel’s surname
“Fiugel.” We are grateful to Merari for bringing these typos to our attention (in personal
correspondence) and apologize for them.
How Can We Advance the Study of Suicide Bombers’ Motivations?
Our debate with Merari centers on the question of which imperfect methodology can pro-
vide a more accurate understanding of suicide bombers’ motivations. Merari recommends
interviewing a tiny, unrepresentative, convenience sample of would-be bombers using tests
of questionable value in a prison setting that is likely to compromise the validity of re-
spondents’ statements. We recommend in-home, in-depth, semi-structured, independent
interviews of clusters of people who were intimately acquainted with the bombers and
represent a larger, random sample of them, acknowledging that such respondents may wish
to present the bombers in a positive light and be unaware of the bombers’ inner turmoil.
In our opinion, Merari’s characterization of his approach as “objective” and ours as
“subjective” is completely misleading. The degree to which knowledge approaches an
“objective” standard (or as we prefer to put it, an intersubjective consensus) depends less
on the researchers’ methods and biases than on the scrutiny of the research community. The
important issue is which method produces results that offer the best opportunities for checks
on reliability and validity. The scientific community will in due course reject knowledge
produced by accredited professionals using standardized procedures if they find that the
research rests on shaky foundations. It will accept knowledge produced idiosyncratically
by biased researchers if reliability and validity checks pan out.33 American novelist Kurt
Vonnegut put the latter case in the right perspective when he wrote in one of his essays that
the most beautiful marigold he ever saw was growing in a bucket of cat manure.
We regard Merari’s method as relatively impervious to checks on reliability and validity
because all that seems to matter to him are the interpretations of like-minded psychologists,
even if (perhaps especially if) they are willing to ignore problems with sampling procedures,
the quality of measurement instruments, and reactivity. In contrast, we sought to validate
our data by conducting multiple, independent interviews concerning each suicide bomber
and, when necessary, checking interviews against external documentary sources, both
published and unpublished. Merari notes we could have gone farther and invited an outside,
trained researcher to code our data independently. He is right. Therefore, in the interest
of advancing knowledge about the motivations of suicide bombers, we invite him and his
research associates to discuss with us the possibility of independently coding our digitally
recorded interviews. They can then see if they reach similar conclusions about our data and
submit the results for publication in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.
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